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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff, Judy Baxter, brought the action for
the purpose of causing a dissolution of an alleged partnership.

Defendants deny any such partnership.did, or should,

exist and counterclaim for damages resulting from . the Plaintiff's continued use -of ·:real property· deeded to the Defendant
Squaw Peak, Inc. by the Plaintiff and Warburton Investment.
DISPOSITION OF CASE
The trial court awarded the Plaintiff a

twenty~five

percent (25%) limited interest in the business to be conducted
on the premises by the Defendants, including all the assets
of the business.

The Plaintiff was also awarded the use of

a red brick home located on the premises.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Without specifically ruling on the admissibility
of Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 4, the trial court based its
disposition of the case largely on these documents and the
testimony of the Plaintiff in connection with these exhibits.
The Defendants made repeated objections to the admissibility
of these exhibits, and the testimony associated with them,
1
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basing the objections upon the Statute of Frauds, the
Doctrine of Merger, Parole Evidence and lack of consideration.

The Defendants seek to have this Court hold that

these Exhibits and the accompanying testimony are inadmissible, and direct the lower court to enter

a finding that

the Plaintiff has no interest in the real property conveyed
by Plaintiff and another to Squaw Peak, Inc., nor in any
other business assets of Squaw Peak, Inc.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff acquired the realty in question on
July 1, 1977 for $150,000.

Transcript of Trial, page 7.

In January of 1978, the building on the premises, known as
the Riverbend Lounge, burned down.

The Plaintiff recovered

$65,000 in insurance proceeds which went directly to reduce
the prinicipal of the indebtedness, leaving $65,000 still
owing.

Transcript of· Trial, page 8.

In order for the struc- ~

ture to ever be rebuilt, construction had to commence within
one year from the fire; however, the Plaintiff was unable
to obtain sufficient financing to provide for the structure
to be rebuilt.

Transcript of Trial, pages 8 and 9.

The Plaintiff received three (3) offers to purchase::
the property, all of them generated by the Defendant, Tom
Stubbs.

Transcript of Trial, page 9.

Apparently, no other

2
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parties were interested in the property.
On November 1, 1978, the Plaintiff and Warburton
Investment, a partnership, executed a Warranty Deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3) as Granters, which conveyed the property to the Defendant Squaw Peak, Inc.
pages 14 and 66.

Transcript of Trial,

The Warranty Deed was then escrowed with

Wasatch Bank until Squaw Peak, Inc._acquired a S.B.A. loan.
The closing on the S.B.A. loan, and the final disbursements
to the

Plaintiff~

took place on April 3, 1979.

Transcript

of Trial, pages 14 and 67, also, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3.
The Warranty Deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3) is subject to
certain easements and restructions [sic] of record and requires the Grantee, the Defendant Squaw Peak, Inc., to pay
the 1978 taxes.

Pla~ntiff's

Exhibit No. 3.

The Plaintiff has received a total of $170,000 for
the real property; $65,000 from insurance proceeds; $40,000
by check when the,warranty Deed was placed in escrow with

Wasatch Bank; and $65,000 when Warranty Deed was delivered
by the escrow agent to Squaw Peak, Inc. on April 3, 1979.

Transcript of Trial, pages 14, 31, 33, 41, 42, 59 and 67.
The Warranty Deed was recorded with the Utah County Recorder's Office ori'April 4, 1979.

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3.

The proceeding facts include all the evidence, pertinent to this appeal, which the Appellants and Defendants
3
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believe to have been admissible.

Some of the above-des-

cribed facts may also be inadmissible.

In addition to the

proceeding facts, the trial court heard the facts described
below.
An Earnest Money Receipt and Off er to Purchase

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1) was jointly prepared and executed by·'the Defendant Torn Stubbs and the Plaintiff on
September .5, 1978.as the initial contract concerning the
conveyance of the property by the Plaintiff to the Defendants.

Transcript of Trial, page 9.

Subsequent to the exe-

cution of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase,
the Defendant Torn Stubbs and the Plaintiff executed Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, purporting to create an interest in
the

~Defendants'

business and business assets (restaurant).

Transcript of Trial, page 12.

There is no evidence of con-

sideration for Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2.
The trial court also believed it was important that
the Defendant Torn Stubbs had previously made another offer
on. the property for $140,000.
POINT I
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 4 are merged in
Warranty Deed.
The doctrine of merger, which this Court recognizes, is applicable when the acts to be per4
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POINT II
The Earnest Money Receipt Does Not Survive The
Execution And Delivery Of The Warranty Deed
.The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase,
Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 and 4, states:
It is understood and agreed that the terms
written in this receipt constitute the entire
preliminary contract ..•. It is further agreed
that the execution of the final contract shall
abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase.
Interpreting these exact provisions, this Court
was held:
The delivery and acceptance of a deed, executed
pursuant to the provisions of a precedent contract for the sale of real property, may merge
rights conferred by the contract into it. Stipulations in the prior contract, of which con- ·
veyance is not a performance, are superseded by
the deed if the parties intended to surrender
them. These principals are founded upon the
privilege which parties always possess to change
their contract obligations by further agreement
prior to performance.
Plaintiff also clearly demonstrated a lack
of intention to perpetuate the option by subsequently affixing this signature on the closing
documents and accepting them and the deed of
conveyance without equivocation. Bowen v. Olsen,
576, P.2d 862, 864 (Utah, 1978) emphasis added.
In the.case currently before the Court, the

Plain~

tiff (seller) executed and caused the deed to be delivered
without any reservation of any interest in the property,
even though certain reservations were noted in the face of

7
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the deed, notably one which required grantee to pay all of
1978 taxes, even though the Plaintiff's Deed was not exe-

cuted until November 1978 nor delivered until April 1979.
The terms of Plaintiff's 'Exhibits No. 1 and 4 would have
required a proration of the taxes; however, this protection for the Defendants was removed by the Plaintiff
when she drafted the Warranty Deed.
In Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226, 419 P.2d 198
(1966), this Court also addressed the abrogation clause in

the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase.

In that

opinion, the Court held a merger of the Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase did indeed occur.

This Court

found:
We have difficulty seeing why a waranty deed
to Hansen [Buyer] should not abrogate the preliminary, loosely: drawn and almost incoherent·.
Earnest Money Receipt, and thus merge what
really amounted only to signed notes of a contemplated future transaction for a deed, voluntarily executed subject to and actually recorded
under conceded recording procedures, which was
accomplished and sanctioned by legislative
authority. Kelsey v. Hansen, supra, pp. 198-199.
In Kelsey v. Hansen, supra, p. 199, this Court
pointed out, "There might be cases that could cut through
such a case, in equity, for fraud, mistake and the like ... "
but such was not the case there, nor is the instant case
such a case.

8
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POINT III
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 Lacks Consideration
The testimony of the Plaintiff, and the representations made at trial by counsel for the Plaintiff, is that
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, referred to by the Plaintiff as
the Addendum to the Earnest Money Receipt and Of fer to
Purchase, was executed by the Plaintiff and the Defendant
Tom Stubbs subsequent to the execution of the Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase (Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1
and 4) which "constitute the· entire preliminary contract."
Transcript of Trial, page 12.

On its face, Exhibit No. 2

retains additional rights in the property, in favor of the
Plaintiff, after conveyance by Plaintiff than does Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.

There is no consideration, however,

flowing from the Plaintiff to any of the Defendants as a
result of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2.

Without this con-

sideration, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 cannot be enforceable, even if one assumes that it survives the doctrine of
merger.

In addition, the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer

to Purchase, Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 4, purports to be
the final preliminary modification,. must. clearly set forth
that the ·modification· alters the original agreement.

This

is not the case.
9
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POINT IV
Plaintiff Received Bargained For Consideration
The testimony of the Plaintiff was that she was
to.receive a twenty-five
restaurant.

percent (25%) interest' in the new

In exchange for this interest the Defendants

would be required to pay the Plaintiff only $40,000 of the
agreed $105,000 sales price.

The Plaintiff testified,

"That's why they I the Defendants] didn't pay me [the Plain- _

'''Ll

tiff] the full $105,000."

That $65,000 was to be part of

twenty-five percent (25%) interest in the new restaurant.

''fo:

Transcript of

Tr~al,

page 12.

The Plaintiff later testified,

that the full $105,000 was paid by the Defendants by paying
the Plaintiff $40,000 and relieving the Plaintiff of a
$65,000 obligation to Wasatch Bank.
page 31.
~hat,

Transcript of Trial,

The testimony of the Plaintiff is, therefore,

.if the Defendants did not pay the full $105,000 pur-

chase price, she was to receive a twenty-five percent (25%)
interest in·the restaurant business.

However, she was paid

the =full pruchase price.
Furthermore,, the Plaintiff made a $20,000 profit
on the property, which she held for approximately twentytwo (22) months, even though the major structure on the
premises was destroyed by fire during that period and the

<:

10
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Plaintiff failed to have adequate insurance on the structure to rebuild it.

If this Court allows the Plaintiff to

retain a twenty-five percent (25%) interst in the property,
she will have, by her testimony, made an additional $100,,000
profit on the sale.

Transcript of Trial, page 23.

If the

Plaintiff's figures are accurate, and a twenty-five percent
(25%) interest in the property gives her $100,000 equity
position in the property, the property is worth approximately $400,000 as bare ground.

Knowing this, the Plaintiff

nevertheless sold the property for $105,000.

The reason

the Plaintiff sold the property for $105,000 is because that
is all it was worth asi.bare ground.

The .. $100,000 equity she

referred to is only something she has imagined.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff sold the Defendants real property
at $105,000.
Warranty Deed.

All prior agreements were merged in the
To the extent this Court determines they

have not merged, the Plaintiff testified that she was to
receive a twenty-five percent (25%) interest only if she
was paid only $40,000.

In fact, the Plaintiff received the

full $105,000 purchase price.
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, in addition to being
merged in the Warranty Deed, lacks.consideration sufficient
11
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to make it a binding contract.
The Defendants ask that all right, title and
interest of the Plaintiff in the property be extinguished
in favor of the Defendant Squaw Peak, Inc •

. !-iAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of
the Brief of Appellant Thomas C. Stubbs, Frank Horton·and
Squaw Peak, Inc. to Matt Biljanic, Attorney for Respondent,
7355 South 900 East, Midvale, Utah 84047, postage prepaid,
this

lfl-A_

day of February, 1980.
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